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1. Introduction and purpose 
1.1 Introduction.  
1.1.1 The HTTR facility. 
The HTTR facility explores the advantages and efficiency of high-temperature helium gas 
reactors for hydrogen generation (in conjunction with production of conventional thermal 
power), based on nuclear power. The high temperature gas may be used in hydrogen 
production facilities, like for instance in the concept of the RAPHAEL project (Hittner et al., 
2006) and some reactors of the GEN IV (GIF, 2002). 
 
HTTR includes a graphite moderated, helium gas-cooled reactor with a thermal power of 30 
MW and a reactor coolant outlet temperature of 950ºC (Saito et al., 1994). 
The reactor cooling system consists of a primary cooling system (PCS), a secondary helium 
cooling system (SHCS), a pressurized water cooling system (PWCS) and a vessel cooling 
system (VCS), as schematically shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Reactor cooling system of HTTR (Saito et al., 1994). 
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1.1.2 Safety design features  
As it is customary, and as indicated in its safety analysis report (Saito et al., 1994), the HTTR 
design use standard deterministic safety assessment techniques to ensure that a carefully 
defined Design Basis Envelop (DBEP), groups actual transients in design categories such that 
protections envisaged for representative transients of the different categories are adequate 
enough. 
 
By this it is meant that any of the actual transients that may really occur will have no worse 
consequences as those anticipated by the study of the representatives of each DBEP category, 
henceforth called design basis transients. Consequences are characterized by the damage that 
may be generated, defined as a given function of process variables (damage indicators) 
exceeding specified allowed limits (hereafter safety limits) during its time evolution.  
In Table 1 the safety limits of concern are specified 
 
Table 1 Acceptance criteria for anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) for the HTTR 
(Kunitomi et al., 2004) 
 The peak fuel temperature shall be less than 1600 ºC 
 Pressure on reactor pressure boundary is less than 1.1 times of maximum 
pressure in service (<5.28 MPa). 
 Maximum temperatures of reactor pressure boundary  
9/4Cr-1Mo steel<500 ºC 
Austenitic stainless steel<600 ºC 
Hastelloy XR<980 ºC 
 
1.2. Purpose 
Given the complexity of interactions between protection actions, phenomena, and dynamic 
processes, it becomes difficult to verify that indeed the acceptance criteria are met. A new 
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approach to tackle this and other issues related with potentially undue grouping, due to 
dynamic, features has been developed within the regulatory space of the Nuclear Industry. It 
is based on the Theory of Stimulated Dynamics (TSD) and includes a risk assessment 
methodology as well as a platform of simulation tools for its implementation (Izquierdo and 
Cañamon, 2008; Izquierdo and Cañamón, 2006; Izquierdo et al., 2008; Labeau and Izquierdo, 
2005a, b; Sánchez et al., 2009), all together named TSD. 
 
We call “damage domain” of a given safety limit the region of the space of uncertain and 
sensitive parameters of interest where the limit is exceeded. The damage domain of the DBEP 
transients should be empty, so no design transient should violate design safety limits for any 
of the transients included in its categories. However, the examination of the damage domains 
sensitivity to the safety limits is of paramount interest for the quality of the design. 
 
The main objective of this and subsequent papers is to generate the HTTR damage domains 
and assess its safety margins on some of the HTTR design basis events, namely anticipated 
operational transients (AOO). This first contribution describes the model and code used for 
damage domain identification and presents some test results on overpower transients. Further 
details of the relation between damage domains and safety margins are described below. 
 
2. - Main characteristics of TSD methods. Damage domains and safety 
margins 
 
A key issue in the safety assessment is to verify the adequacy of the HTTR specified 
maximum allowed initial conditions (LCO, limiting conditions for operation) as well as the 
design of their set points for safeguard initiation signals (LSSS, limiting safety system 
settings). Table 2 specifies those relevant for our case study.  
In Table 2 and Table 3 the expected safeguard action events are shown with an indication of 
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the set points for its automatic initiation (Saito et al., 1994). 
 
Table 2 Safeguards considered available in the AOO- HTTR safety assessment (Saito et al., 
1994) 
Systems or components AOO 
Reactor Protection system 
Control Rod (CR) system 
Auxiliary Cooling System (ACS) 
Vessel Cooling System VCS 
Emergency power feeder 
Frequency converter of Primary Gas Circulator (PGC) 
Pressurized water pump trip by means of high temperature of PWCS inlet 
pressurized water 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
Table 3 Signals of reactor scram (Saito et al., 1994) 
Signal of reactor scram Established value 
Reactor power at PRMS High 105.5% 
Primary coolant flow rate of IHX Low 92% 
Primary coolant flow rate of PPWC Low 93% 
IHX outlet temperature High 410ºC 
Reactor outlet coolant temperature High 967ºC 
Core differential pressure Low 78% 
Pressurized water flow rate PPWC Low 87% 
Differential pressure between PCS and PWCS High 8.5 kg/cm
2
 
Differential pressure between PCS and PWCS Low 1.5 kg/cm
2
 
Differential pressure between PCS and SHCS Large 1.8 kg/cm
2
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Secondary helium flow rate Low 88% 
Manual scram ------ ------ 
 
In the TSD context, each possible transient, resulting from a given accident initiator and LCO 
conditions, when different combinations of safeguard initiation set points are reached, is 
called a path. Paths are grouped in dynamic sequences defined as the set of all transients that 
have activated the same settings, but differing in its timing. A path is then characterized by a 
set of times within the same dynamic sequence. 
 
When considering the LCO and LSSS parameters, its uncertainty should also be included in 
the assessment. To each path we associate the joint probability of those parameters, and the 
probability aggregate for all transients in the damage domain become the conditioned 
probability of damage relative to the initiator. When multiplied by the frequency of the 
initiator we get the frequency of exceedance of the safety limit, which is the main figure of 
merit in the TSD verifications. For instance, when considering a safety limit more restricted 
than the one required, the frequency of exceedance corresponding to the damage domain 
obtained gives an indication of safety margins and its sensitivity to the settings. 
 
2.1. Identification of damage domains. Adequate deterministic models  
The calculation of the exceedance frequency of a given safety limit, main figure of merit to 
verify the regulatory or design risk limits, is then a two-fold task: (1) damage domain 
identification, i.e. the set of all possible damage transients grouped in a sequence, and  
(2) computation of the exceedance frequency sensitivity to the safety limits i.e. the safety 
margins.  
 
As indicated above, a damage domain of a given safety limit is the locus in the space of 
uncertain parameters where the limit is exceeded. The damage domain is then a volume in the 
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multi-dimensional space of times and parameters, each point in it representing a different 
transient. As a result, a large amount of transients are to be simulated, thus making the model 
to simulate everyone a work-horse essential to TSD application. Indeed, other analysis of 
similar scenarios related to NPP safety, promote simplified and fast resolution models (EPRI, 
2011; Izquierdo et al., 2001). 
 
Because the quantities to be aggregated are positive, it is obvious that if a damage domain 
including another is used, the resultant damage frequency will also be higher than that 
obtained with the included one. This means that we can use lower fidelity models to reduce 
first the very large amount of transients to be covered, improving the model fidelity and detail 
in successive iterations such that the larger the domain the lower the need for detail, provided 
it can be proved and /or checked that no success path damage found with a lower fidelity 
model turns out to be a damage path if simulated with a higher fidelity one. In view of the 
large dimensions of the damage domain this approach is basically inevitable. We focus here in 
finding a first iteration adequate model, the adequacy criterion judged as above. 
 
3. HTTR model for AOO transients with main coolant pumps working 
 
3.1 Relevant HTTR design and operation features 
As can be seen in Fig. 1, the primary cooling system (PCS) is constituted by the main cooling 
system (MCS) and auxiliary cooling system (ACS). The MCS has two heat exchangers: a 
helium-helium intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) and a primary pressurized water cooler 
(PPWC). Primary helium gas is transported from the reactor core to the IHX and PPWC 
through a primary concentric hot gas duct. 
 
The secondary helium cooling system (SHCS), mainly consisting of the secondary 
pressurized water cooler (SPWC), removes the heat from the primary helium gas through the 
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IHX. 
 
The primary water cooling system (PWCS) consists of an air cooler, water pump and so on. 
An air cooler cools the pressurized water in both the PPWC and SPWC and transfer the heat 
from the reactor core to the final heat sink of atmosphere. 
 
The ACS is standby during normal operation and starts up to remove the residual heat after a 
reactor scram. 
The vessel cooling system (VCS) runs at rated flow rate during normal operation to cool the 
biological concrete shield. 
It cools the reactor under a no forced-cooling condition such as a primary pipe rupture 
accident when the ACS is no longer able to cool the core effectively. 
 
The schematic block diagram of the different cooling loops is represented in Fig. 2. Further 
details of the system are described in (Saito et al., 1994) 
 
Fig. 2 shows the block diagram of the different cooling loops locating the five main regions of 
the main reactor cooling system. For transients working in an operating mode with the IHX 
out of service, as the case example analyzed below, only these regions are modelled. If in 
emergency operation mode with only the auxiliary helium exchanger (AHX) pumps operating, 
a similar cooling loop involving the core and AHX loop is the one of interest. For parallel, at 
power operation, the IHX secondary helium circuit is included with a similar treatment. Thus, 
the basic module for simulation is a five region loop model. 
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the reactor cooling system of HTTR. 
 
3.2 Simulating abnormal operational transients. The GASTEMP/HTTR code 
Below we describe general aspects of our GASTEMP/HTTR5 code model, called that way 
because it considers only one region at each of the five loop sections of the main module, and 
it is further simplified by using a high velocity approximation of the thermal-fluid 
conservation equations (see appendix A). All data are the same as those used in the JAERI 
ACCORD code (Takeda et al., 2000). Properties of the fuel, moderator and coolant are also 
taken from HTTR sources (Fujimoto et al., 2004; Iyoku et al., 2004; Saito et al., 1994; Sumita 
et al., 2004; Takeda et al., 2000). 
 
3.2.1 The GASTEMP/code 
GASTEMP (Benikhlef et al., 2011; Izquierdo and Sanchez, 2007) was developed to account 
for the enthalpy and mass balances of a time varying volume that includes a mixture of 
non-condensable and condensable gases. The volume may be heated by an external source 
and/or by internal chemistry reactions. 
 
In our case there is just a single, non-reacting gas, but with a sophisticated external heat flux 
like the reactivity-fed nuclear heat flux described in section 4.3 below. The heat flux is 
computed by the HTTR5 sub-code, as described below. In appendix B, we also provide 
additional details about the coupling of both codes. 
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It may be easily shown that Eqs. A-6 and A-10, main implication of the high velocity loop 
assumption, lead to a special application of the energy and mass balances that are the basis of 
GASTEMP, that uses standard ordinary differential equations (ODE) solvers. We have then 
adapted GASTEMP to incorporate solutions of the nuclear and heat exchanger heat-flux 
models like those described in section 4. Instead of a single volume, we now have five main 
volumes connected through the volumetric flows as described in Eq. A-13. 
 
The extra methods required for the GASTEMP-HTTR adaptation are then limited to add the 
solvers for the heat flux equations of type B.5 and connect the five volumes, speeding up the 
rest of the code.  
 
In summary, GASTEMP/HTTR5 is an adaptation of the GASTEMP code to solve the set of 
equations that describe the five sections module of the HTTR cooling loops, as described in 
the follow sections. 
 
4. The HTTR core-heat transfer code  
4.1. Neutron power. The point model. 
A single group point-kinetics model is used, the model constants obtained from the ACCORD 
data (Takeda et al., 2000)  
 n n C q ,  C n C (1) 
 
4.2 Decay heat power 
The model for decay heat of fission products after reactor scram, is also following the 
ACCORD approach for fission products and actinide decay heat. 
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exp( ) exp( )1
exp( )j
B u u s pu pu sd act U Pu
j s j u s
jd d u pu
t tP P RE RE
A t t
n n Q Q Q
 (2) 
Parameters A and B depend on the elapsed time after scram, 
st , and are shown in Table 4. 
j is 1 if in interval 1j s jt t t  and zero otherwise 
 
Table 4 Decay heat parameters in Shure’s formula (Takeda et al., 2000) 
 ts(s) A B 
 0.1 10st  12.05 0.0639 
 10 150st  15.31 0.1807 
 
6150 4 10st x  26.02 0.2834 
 
64 10 sx t  53.18 0.335 
To simplify the description, in the following we will not consider the decay heat, that is 
however included in the code as an additional heat source. 
 
4.3 Reactivity feedback 
It takes into account the reactivity coefficients of the HTTR (Saito et al., 1994; Takeda et al., 
2000). The total reactivity is f v bc
f v bc
T T Z
x
x T t T t Z t
 (3) 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the Doppler feedback and the moderator reactivity coefficient. 
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Fig. 3. Doppler coefficient. 
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Fig. 4. Moderator temperature coefficient. 
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4.4 Core heat transfer: heat flux to the coolant 
For the heat transfer from the fuel to the coolant, we choose a classical simple model 
accounting for different thermal resistances for each node, as shown in Fig. 5: left side for the 
fuel compact and right side for the transfer tube of the heat exchangers. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Cross section of a fuel element and heat transfer tube. 
The heat flux transmitted between two consecutive layers, for instance cladding, v, and fluid, 
He, is 
 ( )
v He
vc n f
v
T T
n t
R
 (4) 
and the heat balance is (residual heat not included) 
 
1 1 1
f nf fv f v
ff f g f f g
T T T n
CC R R C R R
 (5) 
 
1 1v f g
v fv vHe f v He
v vv f g v v f g
R R R
T T T T
C RC R R C R R R
 (6) 
where we have incorporated the gap conductance Rg assumed to be small enough as to have 
zero heat capacity. 
If the core is divided in n-core nodes then 
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 1)()(
,1 ncorej
jjj tntn  (7) 
with j  the fraction of neutron power generated in node j. 
 
5. Main cooling loop mass and energy conservation equations. 
5.1 Heat exchangers region heat transfer. 
An entirely similar approach is used in the heat exchangers, where equations 5 to 7 are also 
used according to Fig. 5 right. 
 
Because the water circuit has a pressure control, it is assumed that its temperature is kept in 
steady state, so the transient modelling considers it as a steady heat sink temperature. This 
heat exchanger water steady state, may also be divided in Nhex axial nodes with a steady 
water temperature in
wj j wT hex T  
with coefficients jhex computed at steady state conditions. 
The assumption of an average heat capacity of the metal and fluid may be used as an option, 
particularly in global balances.  
 
5.2 Main cooling loop global balances 
Without loss of generality we assume an operation mode where the loop mass is kept constant. 
According to Eq A.8 of appendix A, the loop global balance reads in this case 
 loop loopM G  
loop
jloop loop loop
He He w
dh
M
dt
 
loop
loop v He
v He
v
T T
R
 (8) 
 1 1( )loopHe w He w
He t t w
U T T U
R R
 (9) 
 
and the system composed by Eq (1), Eq. (2), Eq. (3), Eq.(4) and Eq. (9) can be represented 
as, 
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0 0 0
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1/1/
0 0 0
ff f f g f f gf
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v loop
Hev vv f g v v f g
He
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p p
n
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TC C R R C R RT
TR R R
T
TC RC R R C R R R
T
Rv UAR
GC GC
0
0 0 0
0
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0*
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0
0 0 0 0
w
p
UA
T t
GC
 (10) 
 
As a result of the global balance the loop heat flux loop loop loopHe He wQ t  is determined. 
 
5. 3 Mass and energy regional balances 
In appendix A we describe the basis for the following mass and enthalpy balances at high 
speed in loops. They take into account that the gas coolant experiences significant 
expansion/contraction due the heating/cooling flux, so the volumetric flow j(z,t) (velocity ) is 
quite different at the entrance of each of the four regions described above. A general volume 
conservation equation (see section 6.1 below) was also used. 
 
Region j enthalpy balance  
 
,( )
ln
2 2 2
0
reg reg reg reg
j j j j steady
regreg reg reg reg
jj j j jin loop loop
j reg
j
d
m h t Q t Q
dt
t d h uQ u d p dV u
du j u Q u M
du du du
 (11) 
 
Region j mass balance 
( )ln
( )
2 2 2
0
regionreg reg reg reg
jj j j jregion loop in
j j reg
j
t d m uQ u d p dV ud
m t M du j u
dt du du du  (12) 
For unheated sections the same equations apply with null heat-flux. 
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6 Computation of volumetric flows 
 
6.1 Volumetric flows  
To close the system it is necessary to compute )(tj ink . As it is well known, a classical volume 
conservation (Herrero and Izquierdo, 2011) gives that 
 ( ) ( ) ( )out in reg k kk k k rk k
dp dV
j t j t Q t
dt dt
  (13) 
 1 1
1/ ln
ln
in out k
k k k k k k k
k sp
m
j j
V h p
 
and the helium equation of state (EOS) provides the pressure as a function of enthalpy and 
density. In (Takeda et al., 2000) a second order Virial series describes helium as a real gas. 
The Virial format is the EOS format chosen in GASTEMP. 
 
 
1 ( )
RT
p B T
Mol
 
3 3
4 5.424.5 10
1890(º )
m m
B T x
kg K T kg
 (14) 
 
Coefficients k , and k are also determined from the EOS , the last being well approximated 
by a constant. 
 
6.2 Pumps modelling 
The above equations allow finding volumetric flows at all regions except the connection at the 
pump inlet and outlet, where the pump characteristics provide the alternate necessary 
information. According to (Takeda et al., 2000), in each pump. 
 
3
2
inletoutlet
inlet inlet inlet
G Tp
a b c
p p T
 (15) 
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When combined with the EOS and mass conservation at the pump inlet, outlet 
 
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( )
outlet outlet outlet outlet outlet outlet inlet oulet outlet
inlet inlet inlet inlet inlet inlet outlet inlet inlet
p T B T j j B G
p T B T j j B G
 (16) 
it provides the relation between the pump volumetric flows inlet and outlet for a given pump 
mass flow and angular velocity that are given as part of the transient scenario description 
 
Fig. 6 shows a reasonable fit (using Eq. 16) to the Q-H characteristic curve of the primary 
and secondary helium circulators (Takeda et al., 2000). 
1
1,01
1,02
1,03
1,04
1,05
1,06
1,07
0 2020 4040 6060 8080 10100 12120 14140 16160 18180 20200 22220
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
 r
a
ti
o
 o
f 
o
u
tl
e
t 
to
 i
n
le
t
Invariant flow rate=(G*Tin
1/2)/Pin
Invariant rotation
/(Tin)1/2
373
406.9
440.8
474.7
508.6
542.5
576.4
610.3
644.2
678.1
 
Fig. 6 Fit to the Q-H characteristic curve of primary and secondary helium circulators 
 
7. Steady states. 
It is important to ensure that success transients start and finish at a steady state. Damage 
transients should start at a steady state and finish when damage indicator process variables 
reach its safety limit. 
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7.1 Core steady states. Global balance 
A steady reactor should be critical, so at steady states 0 . Then, solving Eq. (10) for the 
initial state. 
 
1
4 4
1
14
(0)(0) (0)
(0) 0
(0) (0)
ini ini
j w j jini
ss inij
v He v
AT x
A x
R C n A
 (17) 
 
Eq. 17-takes into account that A(0) is singular, which implies that an initial power and sink 
temperature should be given and then the rest of the temperatures are obtained. 
 
In the same way, those equations work at the final steady states, but now the final values 
should satisfy the reactivity balance given by Eq.3, that ,when integrated , gives the additional 
relation  
0
3,4
( )
( ) (0) 0
final
k
initial
k
xf out inv bc k
k rod rod
x
kf v bc k
T T Z x
dt dx
T t T t Z t x
 (18) 
So, as indicated by Figures 3 and 4, the areas of the reactivity coefficients impose a constraint 
to the final values due to the reactivity feedback, which replaces the need to know the initial 
power. 
 
7.2 Regions steady states.  
 
At each region, we account for the fact that the steady state heat flux should equal the steady 
state power generation. So, once the initial and final steady values of the neutron power n, and 
heat sink temperature Tw are known through the global balance, they are used by the 
GASTEMP routines responsible of finding regional steady states.  
 
8. Application .The rod withdrawal design basis transient  
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8.1 Transient scenario. 
The following scenario description is given in the safety analysis report of the HTTR and it 
has been followed in our parallel GASTEMP/HTTR5 simulation: (Saito et al., 1994).   
“It is assumed that a pair of CRs are abnormally withdrawn by a mis-operation from a 
subcritical condition during a reactor start-up. This transient would cause a reactor power 
increase and a fuel temperature raise with an abnormal insertion of the reactivity into the core. 
However, the operator will be able to recognize the abnormal state by monitoring 
instrumentation of various process parameters and take timely steps to ensure safety. When a 
reactor scram is required, the reactor will be scrammed by the reactor protection system and 
the residual heat will be removed by the ACS. Then this transient will terminate safely”. 
 
8.2 Conditions 
“The following analytical conditions are applied to get reasonably conservative results. 
The reactor power is 10
-7
% (0.03W) of the rated power (30MW). This is the equivalent to a 
power level generated by a neutron source. The primary coolant flow rate is assumed to be 
that for the high temperature test operation mode. The initial temperatures of the fuel, 
moderator and primary coolant are all assumed to be 200ºC as the most conservative value in 
the state of low power operation from the viewpoint of the temperature feedback effect. 
The reactivity coefficients used in the safety analysis are assumed to be the minimum value 
with respect to the temperatures of fuel and moderator, so that the peak core power might 
become maximum by the most conservative negative temperature reactivity feedback effect. 
The reactivity insertion rate by the CR withdrawal is assumed to be 1.2x10
-6
 k/k/s which is 
the boundary reactivity between with and without a scram, and which gives the maximum 
fuel temperature” 
 
8.3 Results 
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the transients of the reactor power and the maximum fuel temperature, 
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using GASTEMP/HTTR5 and JAEA respectively. 
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Fig. 7 Transient behaviour during abnormal control rod withdrawal during subcritical 
condition (GASTEMP/HTTR5) 
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Fig. 8 Transient behaviour during abnormal control rod withdrawal during subcritical 
condition (JAERI) (Saito et al., 1994) 
 
Despite the simplicity of the model, GASTEMP/HTTR5+ results are acceptable, the shape of 
the curves obtained are very similar to the JAEA results, and the stationary values are similar, 
in the case of HTTR5+ for the reactor power is 14.7 MW and in the case of the fuel 
temperature around 1080°C, the results of the JAEA are, for the reactor power around 14.5 
MW and for the fuel temperature 965°C. 
The GASTEMP/HTTR5+ simulates this transient in 9 seconds 
 
9. Preliminary damage domain of the rod withdrawal transient. 
Once the adequacy of the model has been shown, we now test its use for its primary purpose, 
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namely finding damage domains. 
 
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 we present results of the damage domain that was obtained in case of 
failure of the trip system, either because the trip setpoint was not reached, or the trip system 
failed preventing the stop rods to drop (ATWS anticipated transient without scram). 
 
We only considered the high neutron flux reactor trip setting, and included only the rod 
withdrawal speed and the overall reactivity insertion among the parameters. The initial 
situation was with the control bank totally inserted, as it corresponds to the low power test 
start-up operation. These results provide information about the sensitivity of the protection 
design to the neutron flux settings and the associated safety limit. 
 
An initial random sampling of the parameters was performed. Pairs of parameter values were 
formed by taking random values from the variation range of each parameter, namely, from 1 
mm/s to 70 mm/s for the bank speed and from 4.138E-6 to 1.2414E-5 for the differential bank 
worth. 
 
The objective of the random sampling is to get an idea of the damage domain shape. Then, we 
use the parameter sweeping method using the information of the previous method. For each 
parameter, maximum, minimum and delta values are provided to the computer program. The 
process starts by calculating the transient with both parameters at their maximum values. 
Then, the bank worth is decreased by delta steps while maintaining the speed value. This 
process continues until getting a non-damage transient (i.e., reaching the boundary of the 
damage domain) or reaching the minimum worth value. The bank speed is then decreased by 
a delta step and the bank worth sweeping is restarted from its maximum value. The overall 
process ends when additional damage transients are not expected or when both parameters 
reach their minimum values(Hortal, 2012) . 
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Fig. 9. Searching of damage domain using random sampling. 
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Fig. 10. Damage domain search result using a parameter sweeping method. 
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10 Conclusions 
An adequate deterministic model with the capability to analyze damage domains related to the 
HTTR was described and has been applied to a rod withdrawal design basis transient. 
 
The design transient was simulated with the objective to compare results of the HTTR5 with 
those obtained by the JAEA, showing adequate comparison. 
 
The model was then applied to find the damage domain of this design basis transient, showing 
its efficiency. Different sampling methods were used to optimize the search. From these 
results, yet preliminary, the following may be concluded: 
 
1. We confirm the consistency of the results when using two different sampling 
methods to generate the paths. 
2. The results show that a minimum differential bank worth of 7.014E-6 is required 
to get damage, even if no reactor trip is actuated when required (ATWS). 
3. No path was found in the damage domain without activating the high flux reactor 
trip signal, so the damage domain, is expected to have an out of design low 
frequency as it requires failure of the trip system. 
4. There is a trade-off between bank differential worth and bank speed, the worse 
combination being at 17.014 6
bc
E mm
Z
  10bc
Z mm
t s
, as a result of the 
reactivity feedback effects that control the transient into a final steady state. 
 
More detailed information about these preliminary results will be given in subsequent papers. 
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Appendix A 
Special form of the thermo-fluid-dynamic balances in loops at high speed 
 
General balance equations 
The general balance equations of fluid mechanics may be given a special form when 
considering fluid loops with high velocity due the high capacity of the pumps. For any 
extensive property ),( tz , a loop of length L implies that  
 ),(),( tztLz jj  (A.1) 
so, if ( , )z t  represents the time it takes to traverse the loop starting at ( , )z t  and we assume 
it to be small enough 
  
dt
d
tztztz
j
jj ),(),(),(  (high velocity approximation) (A.2) 
Then, the traditional transport balance   
 
z
j
tz
j
tDt
D
S
Dt
D jj
j
jjjjjjvjjv
  (A.3) 
may be average- integrated along the loop during time tau(z,t) so that  
 
( )( , ) ( )( , ) ( , )
loop loop loop loop loop loop
j j j j j j j j j jloop
d M M j z L t j z t M Gz t
S
dt t L t L t
 (A.4) 
where all quantities labelled loop mean the averages around it. So, we have that 
 
( , ) ( , )
( , )
( , )
loop loop
j j j jloop
G z t M z tL
S z t
t z t t
 (A.5) 
and 
 
( , )
( , ) ( ,0) ( , )
( , )
0
loop loop
j jloop
j j j j
t M z uL
G z t G z du S z u
z u u
 (A.6) 
 
Global Loop balance 
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A global balance in the loop gives that  
 
( , )1
( , )
0
loop loop
j jloop in out
j in j out
L M z t
dz S z t w w
L t
 (A.7) 
 
 
1 1
( , ) ( , )
0 0
loop loop in out loop
j j j in j out
L L
M dz z u w w dz S z u
t L L
 (A.8) 
 
where outj
in
j ww ,  and outin ,  are the flow mass in and out of the loop and their transported 
properties.  
 
Regional balances 
On the other hand, the classical balance in one given portion of the loop gives  
 
, , ,( )region region region in region region out region out region in outj j j in j j j in j out region
m t G G S w w
t
(A.9) 
 
and using Eq. A.4 assuming no flow out of the loop in the region  
 
 
, , ,( )
( , )
1/ ( , ) ( , )
0
region region region region in region region out region out
j j j in j j steady
loop
jloop loop
region j
region
m t S G G
t
t z u
L du dz j z t S z u M
u
 (A.10) 
where we have also made the approximation  ),(
),(
tzj
uz
L
 with ),( tzj  the fluid 
velocity. For large values of t compared with the loop times, we may approximate 
,( ) ( )
region loop
j j regiont t  )()( tmtm
loop
j
region
j  , ( ) ( )
loop region
j region j
j
S t S t  (A.11) 
On the other hand  
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0
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1
( ) ( , ) ( )
2
z
out
region
region region
reg
out
reg
dz j z u F z u j u F z u dz j z u F z u
z
j u j z t F u
z
(A.12) 
 
 
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ln ( , ) ( , )
( , )
d d
j z t z t Q z t p z t V z t
z z t dt dt
 (A.13) 
 
and using the properties of the steady state and reincorporating the flows in-out the loop, we 
get the special form of the balance  
 
,
,
( ) ( )
( )( ) ln ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
0
region region region region regin regout
j j steady j in j out
region
jreg reg reg regin loop loop
region j
reg
m t S t S w w
t
t uQ u d p dV u
du j u S u M
du du u
 (A.14) 
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Appendix B  
-Core heat flux and its coupling to GASTEMP
 
The system showed in section 3, composed by Eq. (1), Eq. (5), and Eq. (6) could be 
represented as, 
 4( ( ), ) ( ( )) ( ( ), ) ( )
j
He
v v
x t t H t x t t T t
C R
 (B.1) 
with 
 
0 0
0 0
( ) *1 1 1
0
1
0 0
f
f f f g f f g
v
v f g
v f g v v f g
n
C
H
T
C C R R C R R
T
R R R
C R R C R R R
  (B.2) 
with a solution 
 
4
0
( )
( , ) exp ( ) (0) exp ( ) ( )
t
He
j k
j k j
k v v
T u
x t H t x H t u
C R  (B.3) 
For j=4 4 ( , ) ( , )vx t T t  
 
 4 44
0
( )
( , ) exp ( ) (0) exp ( )
t
He
v k
k
k v v
T t u
T t H t x H u
C R  (B.4) 
and the heat flux is  
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44
4 44
0
1
2( , ) ( ) 1
1 ( )
1 1
exp ( ) (0) exp ( ) ( ) ( )
v He
He
v He v He v v He
t
k He
k
kv He v He v v
H
T t T t
T t
R R C R
H t x du H t u T u
R R C R
 (B.5) 
where  is a time step such that  
 44
44
exp ( ) 1 1
v f g
v v f g
R R R
H u H u u
C R R R
 (B.6) 
Eq B.5 provides the heat flux at time t as a function of the fluid temperature at the same time, 
as required to couple it to GASTEMP . The integrals are computed with efficient conventional 
methods involving past time history, so already known at time t.
  
The same technique is applied to the heat exchanger heat flux and to the global balance, in 
this case replacing THe by Tw and matrix H by A in Eq. 10 of the main text.
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Figure captions 
Fig.1 Reactor cooling system of HTTR (Saito et al., 1994). 
Fig.2 Schematic diagram of the reactor cooling system of HTTR. 
Fig.3 Doppler coefficient. 
Fig.4 Temperature coefficient of moderator. 
Fig.5 Cross section of a fuel element and heat transfer tube 
Fig.6 Fit to the Q-H characteristic curve of primary and secondary helium circulators 
Fig.7 Transient behaviour during abnormal control rod withdrawal during subcritical  
 condition HTTR5+ 
Fig.8 Transient behaviour during abnormal control rod withdrawal during subcritical 
 condition JAERI 
Fig. 9. Searching of damage domain using random sampling. 
Fig. 10. Searching of damage domain using a parameter sweeping. 
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List of acronyms 
ACS Auxiliary cooling system 
AGC Auxiliary gas circulator 
AHX Auxiliary heat exchanger 
AOO Anticipated operational occurrence 
ATWS Anticipated transient without scram 
CR Control rod 
DBEP Design basis envelop 
HTTR High Engineering Test Reactor 
IHX Intermediate heat exchanger 
JAEA Japan Agency of Energy Atomic 
LCO Limiting conditions for operation 
LSSS Limiting safety system settings 
ODE Ordinary differential equations 
PCS Primary cooling system 
PGC Primary gas circulator 
PPWC Primary pressurized water cooler 
PRMS Power range monitoring system 
PWCS Pressurized water cooling system 
SGC Secondary gas circulator 
SHCS Secondary helium cooling system 
SPWC Secondary pressurized water cooler 
TSD Theory of stimulated dynamics 
VCS Vessel cooling system 
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Nomenclature 
 Symbol Description Units 
  Fraction of delayed neutrons  
 vC ,Cp Heat Capacity at constant volume or pressure J/K 
 bcZ  Control rod position m 
 j  Volumetric flow m
3
/s 
 fT  Fuel temperature ºC 
 vT  Cladding temperature ºC 
 HeT  Helium temperature ºC 
  Decay constant s
-1
 
  Mean generation time s 
 C  Precursors power W 
 q  Neutron source W 
 
G
 
Flow rate kg/s 
 n  Neutron power W 
 
inletp
 
Pressure at pump inlet MPa 
 
outletp
 
Pressure at pump outlet MPa 
  Reactivity  
  Pump rotation speed min
-1
 
 
inletT
 
Temperature inlet C 
 ss steady state  
 d
n
 steady power prior to the transient W 
 dP  Fission product decay heat W 
 ts Elapsed time after scram s 
 actP  Decay heat of actinide W 
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 Symbol Description Value 
 Q  Average energy released per fission 200MeV 
 UE  Average energy released by decay of 239U 0.474MeV 
 NpE  Average energy released by decay of 239Np 0.419MeV 
 Np  Decay constant of 
239
Np 3.41x10
-6
MeV 
 U  Decay constant of 
239
U 4.91x10
-4
s
-1
 
 R Generation ratio of 
239
U during reactor operation 0.636 
 
 Parameter Value 
 a 0.9935665 
 b 
3
4
1/2 2
2.094
s
E
K m
 
 c 4 26.09E Ks  
